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Abstract 
 
Although ideological polarization can create problems for governability and 
democratic stability, I argue that it also has beneficial effects in new democracies. By 
clarifying the political alternatives, polarization creates strong links between parties 
and voters, and thereby instills mechanisms of accountability. These mechanisms 
force parties to remain responsive to evolving voter preferences. A comparative 
historical analysis of six South American cases demonstrates that the vast differences 
in the quality of representation in the 1980s, immediately after many countries in the 
region returned to democracy, were rooted in an early bifurcation of party systems in 
the first half of the twentieth century: While prolonged periods of ideological conflict 
occurred in some countries in this period, polarization was aborted by various means 
in others. By showing that ideological moderation may help formal democracies to 
survive, but that aborting conflict in the long run severely hampers key aspects of the 
quality of democracy, this article suggests a revision of conventional views regarding 
ideological polarization. 
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Introduction 
 
Party systems in new democracies differ dramatically in their capacity to structure 
citizen preferences and represent them in the political process, which would be one of 
the most central goals of popular rule according to democratic theory. In this article, I 
argue that in the long run, party systems that experienced prolonged periods of 
ideological conflict differ starkly from those where elites avoided polarization. 
Contrasting party platforms allow voters to make sense of what politics is about and 
create strong links between social groups and political parties. If parties retain their 
spacial positions, ongoing conflict is capable of reproducing alignments over 
generations, instilling long-term mechanisms of programmatic accountability.  
The stark differences in terms of the quality of representation in Latin America 
provide an excellent context to verify this claim. What is more, a coherent theoretical 
framework to explain how party systems rooted in ideology emerged in some Latin 
American countries, but failed to crystallize in others, is still lacking. I argue that the 
paths between representative and unrepresentative party systems bifurcate when – at 
different points in the first half of the twentieth century, depending on the country – 
the left makes its appearance on the political scene. At this point, party systems either 
became polarized, or saw competition restricted. Parties started offering distinctive 
platforms along the economic policy dimension early in the twentieth century in Chile 
and Uruguay, and with the advent of Peronism in Argentina. As I will show, these 
party systems still stood out in the 1990s in terms of representational quality. The 
balance of power between left and right is crucial in explaining whether party systems 
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became polarized or not: Where the established social and political elites felt 
threatened by leftist parties, they banned challengers, resorted to the military to 
intervene, or employed clientelistic benefits to de-mobilize newly emerging social 
groups. Peru is the prime example in this article where elements of all of these 
strategies were employed in combination. Likewise, pacted transitions back to 
democracy, such as those that occurred in Colombia and Venezuela in 1958, proved 
damaging for political representation. What these countries, along with others that I 
study in less detail – Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Mexico – have in common, is that 
they represent instances of what I call “aborted polarization”. As a consequence, 
responsive party systems either never formed, or parties progressively lost touch with 
society as they cartelized. 
My central claim is thus that the quality of representation – a term I define below – 
in the 1980s and 1990s, after many countries in Latin America had re-democratized 
after years of military dictatorships, displayed patterns stemming from a long-term 
path dependent evolutionary process. Considerable research has addressed changes in 
Latin American party systems since the 1980s.1 But with the exception of Kitschelt et 
al. 's recent book,2 we lack a comparative account based on a limited set of variables 
to explain where the initial configuration in the 1980s came from, and what 
mechanisms underpinned its continuity for much of the early twentieth century. What 
is more, if the focus is on the impact of historical polarization, continuities actually 
remain stronger than discontinuities. Out of the eleven countries I study, only 
                                                
1 E.g., Roberts 2013; Roberts 2014; Gibson 1997; Stokes 2001; Levitsky 2003; Handlin 2013; Levitsky 
and Loxton 2013; Lupu 2014. 
2 Kitschelt et al. 2010a. 
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Argentina may have jumped off-track by the 2000s. The breakdown of the 
Venezuelan party system, on the other hand, can be explained by the long-term 
consequences of the collusive behavior of the major parties.  
By demonstrating the merits of polarization, I contradict modernization theorists, 
proponents of pacted transitions, and other scholars who have championed political 
moderation as key for democracy.3 In theory, of course, party positions need not be 
polarized, but only sufficiently distinct for programmatic alignments and congruent 
representation to emerge. In reality, however, in the Latin American historical 
context, challenging parties tended to be highly polarizing. Cases where party systems 
were not polarized, yet provided voters with identifiable, distinctive policy options, 
were virtually inexistent – the only partial exception is the Uruguayan case. Given a 
choice between polarization and the absence of policy-based representation, many 
students and observers of Latin American politics endorsed polarization-aborting 
pacts that I show are detrimental for representation. Paradoxically, even the party 
systems literature, albeit being strongly shaped by Lipset and Rokkan’s conflict-based 
explanation of party system formation, has developed a pro-moderation bias at least 
since Sartori’s influential work on polarized pluralism.4 At the same time, recent 
research from the advanced democracies supports my claim that polarization creates, 
while de-polarization dilutes the links between social groups and parties that have 
stabilized party systems since the formation of the historical cleavages.5 Party 
                                                
3 E.g., Lipset 1957; Karl 1986; Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 2; Collier and Collier 2002[1991]. 
4 Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1976. 
5 E.g., Adams et al. 2011; Evans and de Graaf 2013; for Latin America, see Torcal and Mainwaring 
2003. 
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differentiation also fosters another normative desirable goal: Franklin shows that 
individuals’ propensity to vote is rooted in the degree of polarization they experienced 
in the first rounds of elections they participated in, and this is one of the most 
important factors shaping aggregate levels of turnout.6 Evidence from outside Latin 
America likewise suggests that if conflict does not surpass a certain threshold, 
polarization has beneficial effects. Le Bas argues with respect to Africa that 
polarization results in more cohesive and more socially rooted party organizations.7 
Parties of this kind are necessary for democracy to function.  
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. The first section starts out by 
arguing for the need to move beyond party system institutionalization to meaningfully 
capture differences between party systems. Although the empirical analysis will be 
situated at the country level, I then substantiate my claim that polarization is good for 
representation by presenting an individual-level theory of how this process allows 
voters to develop partisan attachments, and argue that these attachments force parties 
to remain responsive to voter preferences even as alignments are reproduced over 
generations. In the second section, I develop a specific theory for the Latin American 
context, identifying the conditions under which polarization lasted long enough for 
this individual-level process to occur and party systems to become anchored in the 
populace. The bulk of the article is then dedicated to a comparative historical analysis 
of six cases, which are chosen based on a briefer analysis of eleven South American 
countries. The predictions derived from this analysis are then used to explain voter-
                                                
6 Franklin 2004. 
7 Le Bas 2011. 
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party congruence in the 1990s, employing existing quantitative evidence. In the final 
section, I discuss rival accounts to my own.  
 
Beyond institutionalization: how congruent representation emerges and perpetuates 
itself 
 
As the actors linking citizens and the political system, parties play a central role in 
democratic governance. Indeed, their representative function makes them a key 
element of democracy itself.8 A first wave of comparative research that sought to 
explain differences between Latin American party systems and elsewhere was based 
on the party institutionalization approach, pioneered by Mainwaring and Scully’s 
seminal book.9 Dix, Coppedge, and Roberts and Wibbels all set out to explain 
differences in the degree to which party system are institutionalized.10 This 
perspective makes the problematic assumption, however, that stable party systems 
tend to offer clearly identifiable policy options, or what Kitschelt terms programmatic 
linkages.11 Where programmatic linkages prevail, goods are distributed according to 
universalistic, publicized criteria and irrespective of whether an individual supported 
the party that distributes the benefits.12 But parties can also build a loyal following – 
resulting in aggregate stability and hence an institutionalized party system – by 
                                                
8 Pitkin 1967; Dahl 1971; Powell 2004; Kitschelt et al. 2010a. 
9 Mainwaring and Scully 1995. 
10 Dix 1989; Coppedge 1998; Roberts and Wibbels 1999. 
11 Kitschelt 2000. 
12 Stokes et al. 2013, 7-10. 
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distributing particularistic benefits, that is, by building clientelistic linkages. Looking 
only at institutionalization, then, makes the Chilean, Uruguayan, Colombian, and 
Venezuelan party systems appear similar for much of the twentieth century. But these 
party systems could hardly look more different in the degree to which they offered 
divergent policy options and in their capacity to respond to popular demands.  
If the quality of representation is the dependent variable, then the lack of sustained 
party differentiation – or polarization – goes a long way to explaining why many 
countries score so low. I define the quality of representation as the degree to which 
parties represent the programmatic preferences of their voters, resulting in congruence 
between parties and voters. Polarization is used in accordance with standard language 
in this article to describe a state of affairs in which left and right parties advocate 
clearly contrasting policies. These policies need not be radical or extreme – not least 
because what is considered radical is highly time-specific – but sufficiently distinct, 
allowing even voters with limited political knowledge to distinguish party platforms. 
Voters can then form ideological schemas for understanding politics, in Conover and 
Feldman’s terms.13 These schemas are the individual-level reflection of conflicts that 
have shaped a society and its party system. Stated this way, it is clear that 
institutionalization is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for good 
representation: For strong programmatic linkages to emerge, the options not only have 
to be stable, but also represent contrasting policy options. Empirical analyses lend 
support to this supposition. For instance, Lachat shows that party polarization 
                                                
13 Conover and Feldman 1984. 
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increases ideological voting.14 At the system level, the clarity of party positions is a 
significant predictor of the quality of representation.15 In an individual-level study of 
new democracies, Dalton and Weldon find that citizens have the capacity to “learn” 
partisanship, but only where party systems provide them with the opportunity to do 
so.16 Likewise, a thread that runs through the recent volume on voting behavior in 
Latin America edited by Carlin, Singer, and Zechmeister, is that polarization is an 
asset to voters, because it allows them to base their vote on group interests, issues, and 
policy output.17 
If sustained and institutionalized, conflict based on policy-related polarization 
results in the crystallization of stable political cleavages. Probably less polarization is 
necessary to maintain cleavages than to forge them in the first place, but some degree 
of periodical conflict is necessary to reinforce the political group identities that 
underlie cleavages, and to stabilize alignments over time.18 In a classical essay, 
Converse estimated that, if we “simulate an electorate launched de novo in a party 
system”, it would take three generations for partisan identification to “mature”.19 
More recently, Dinas has shown that psychological attachments to partisan groups 
strengthen as voters select the same party over several elections.20 It is easy to see that 
                                                
14 Lachat 2008. 
15 Dalton 1985; see also Dalton 2008. 
16 Dalton and Weldon 2007. 
17 Carlin, Singer, and Zechmeister 2014. 
18 Sartori 1968; Bornschier 2010, 57-60. 
19 Converse 1969, 146. 
20 Dinas 2014. 
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this micro-level process can result in the macro-phenomenon that Lipset and Rokkan 
have famously referred to as the “freezing” of the major party alternatives.21 The 
recent literature on the established democracies underscores that political conflict 
constitutes the reproductive mechanism underlying cleavages, even as they adapt to 
reflect new issues and concerns.22 This is particularly true with respect to the 
socialization of new voters, who become acquainted with the prevailing structure of 
conflict in the first set of elections in which they participate.23 At the same time, as the 
Latin American cases testify, because ideological schemas are social constructs, the 
structure of conflict can be reproduced in the minds of voters even during phases in 
which democracy is interrupted by way of political discussion and parental 
socialization. Obviously, the length of the interruption of the electoral calendar 
matters for the ability of links between specific social groups and political parties to 
survive, but so does the initial strength of the cleavage, because strong political sub-
cultures are more likely to persist. Drawing on Lupu and Stokes, an important 
transmitting factor is that the grassroots networks characteristic of ideology-based 
parties tend to survive authoritarian interludes, and then put established parties at an 
advantage in perpetuating the structure of conflict from the prior democratic regime 
once elections are re-established.24 
                                                
21 Lipset and Rokkan 1967. 
22 van der Brug 2010; Bornschier 2010; Evans and Tilley 2011; Adams et al. 2011; Evans and de Graaf 
2013. 
23 Bartolini and Mair 1990, 218; see also the evidence in Lupu 2013, 56-58. 
24 Lupu and Stokes 2010, 102-103. 
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From a cleavage perspective, then, it is clear that polarization plays an important 
role in forming party systems anchored in society. For the most part, however, 
scholars working on party systems in the developing world have written off the 
conflict-ridden path of party system formation followed by the established 
democracies as inappropriate due to the weakness of religious and class identities.25 
At the same time, fears of political instability due to excessive polarization have 
promoted the idea that successful party system development implies ideological 
moderation.26 Thus, although I follow Collier and Collier’s analytical approach, and 
extensively draw on their historical material, we differ in terms of the outcome to be 
explained.27 While they are concerned with the viability of formally democratic 
regimes in the turbulent 1960s and 1970s, I seek to explain the quality of 
representation after the latest wave of democratization in the 1980s. When the focus is 
on the quality of representation it becomes clear that ideological moderation comes at 
the price of fostering party systems that are out of touch with voter preferences. The 
record of several decades of polarized conflict, on the other hand, helps explain why 
Chile, Uruguay and Argentina are different from most other Latin American 
countries. 
 
  
                                                
25 Randall 2001. 
26 Hartlyn 1988; Dix 1989; Collier and Collier 2002. 
27 Collier and Collier 2002. 
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Applying the theory to Latin America 
 
Under which conditions did ideological conflict persist long enough to foster and then 
perpetuate congruence in Latin America? Put simply, prolonged polarization requires 
the prior presence of a strong and unified conservative pole, which subsequently 
allows for the entry of actors advocating redistributive interests. For the sake of 
simplicity, I refer to the latter as left-wing parties, although in the Latin American 
context, this group also comprises cases in which an established party moved to the 
left to mobilize new social groups (Uruguay), or parties that meshed Socialist and 
Fascist ideas (an example of the latter type is Bolivia’s Nationalist Revolutionary 
Movement, MNR). In Western Europe, the church-state conflict delivered a first blow 
on the localized type of clientelistic politics prevalent before programmatic mass 
politics.28 In most of Latin America, a similar conflict between Liberals and 
Conservatives emerged in the nineteenth century, but except for the case of Chile, it 
was largely pacified when mass suffrage was achieved.29 For this reason, polarization 
capable of forming mass alignments occurred only as a result of the mobilization of 
the left, which in many countries coincided with, or indeed was the cause of, the 
process of suffrage expansion.30  
                                                
28 Caramani 2004. 
29 McDonald and Ruhl 1989; Di Tella 2004; Middlebrook 2000; Hawkins et al. 2010, 242-50. 
30 Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, Stephens 1992. 
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Given the costs of repression and the risk of a radicalization of the politically 
excluded it entails,31 conservative elites are likely to tolerate the mobilization of new 
social segments by parties of the left (or transformed elite parties) if they are 
confident to be able to defend their vital interests in parliament. Thus, in line with 
Rueschemeyer, Huber and Stephens’ argument, the presence or absence of unified, 
nationwide conservative or liberal parties to protect such interests was crucial in Latin 
America.32 This condition is itself the outcome of the degree of institutionalization of 
the earlier nineteenth century conflict between Conservatives and Liberals.33 It is 
beyond the scope of this article, however, to fully explore this “critical antecedent”, a 
term introduced by Slater and Simmons.34 Where strong parties defending the 
interests of political and economic elites allowed for a toleration of the left, this 
should result in ideological polarization.  
But polarization also requires that the major parties of the left and right refrain 
from forming pacts that limit the scope of policy alternatives that voters are presented 
with. Pacted transitions to democracy after authoritarian interludes or civil war often 
exclude or marginalize certain actors, which is damaging for representation. In the 
short run, pacts may result in certain interests losing representation due to the 
narrowing down of the policy spectrum. Far more important still are the long-term 
effects of restricting competition: The marginalization of competitors limits the 
inducements established parties have to maintain distinctive policy platforms. Without 
                                                
31 Dahl 1971, chap. 1; Boix 2003, 21-46; Bermeo 1997. 
32 Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, Stephens 1992. 
33 Gibson 1996; Remmer 1984. 
34 Slater and Simmons 2010. 
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open contestation, the dynamic of competition changes: A mainstream (center-)left 
party challenged by a more leftist competitor is likely to lose to this competitor if it 
moves to the center. If contestation is restricted, on the other hand, left-leaning voters 
have nowhere else to go. Consequently, center-left parties do not face immediate 
losses when they collude with their mainstream center-right counterparts and 
eliminate programmatic distinctiveness. Curtailing competition also destroys parties’ 
incentives to adapt to new social demands. I illustrate these mechanisms in a 
comparison of the Uruguayan and Colombian cases, but they also help to explain the 
breakdown of the Venezuelan party system in the 1990s.  
Figure 1 shows the four combinations that result from the critical antecedent 
condition, the strength of the right (first bifurcation), and the critical juncture of 
polarization vs. aborted polarization triggered by the mobilization of the left (the 
second bifurcation). The most propitious route to good representation (Route 1) is 
open only to countries where a balance of power between left and right developed. 
Extensive phases of open competition and polarization set in motion the process 
theorized in the previous section, in which ideologically based partisan attachments 
develop. Pacted transitions to democracy, however, can abort polarization even in 
cases in which the right is strong, especially in the Cold War context (Route 2). 
Second most successful is Route 3, where polarization in the absence of a strong 
protection of elite interests makes democracy fragile, but where partisan identities are 
sufficiently strong to re-surface whenever open elections are held. This path is 
unlikely to be very common, but we will see that it was followed by one important 
case, Argentina. Most widespread in Latin America is Route 4, where the weakness of 
the right induces established actors to pursue strategies to de-politicize social conflict 
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or to resort to the military to defend conservative interests. Indeed, the parliamentary 
right was weak in most countries, as emphasized by students of democratic regime 
stability and party system formation alike.35 The difference between Routes 3 and 
Route 4 is that in the former case, the strategy of de-politicization fails, while in the 
latter it succeeds. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical map of party system trajectories in Latin America 
 
A final note is in order concerning the relationship between ideology and 
clientelism. For various reasons, the emergence of programmatic party-voter linkages 
                                                
35 Gibson 1996; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Geddes 2003, chap. 4; Dix 1989. 
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does not imply the absence of clientelism, as is born out by recent evidence.36 Indeed, 
in the Latin American context, both parties of the left, as well as those on the right are 
likely to pursue “mixed” mobilization strategies. For one thing, the core constituency 
of conservative parties being numerically smaller than that of the left, they resort not 
only to religious and conservative values to mobilize beyond the narrow strata of the 
upper classes. For another, because left-leaning parties in Chile, Argentina, and 
Uruguay had access to state resources early on, they do not conform to Shefter’s 
model of externally mobilized parties, and were able to pursue mixed mobilization 
strategies as well.37 But from a normative point of view, mixed mobilization strategies 
are clearly superior to purely clientelistic ones. Building on Stokes and colleagues’s 
idea of a “diversity of harms” of clientelism to democracy, particularistic exchanges 
most severely undermine democracy when they take on a coercive character and 
impede voters from expressing their policy preferences.38 
 
Research design  
 
A test of the argument put forward in the preceding sections requires a set of countries 
that exhibit variation in terms of my key independent variables, namely, the strength 
of the right, the ability of the left to openly compete, and the resulting duration of 
polarization. Excluding the Central American and Caribbean countries due to their 
                                                
36 Kitschelt and Kselman 2013; Stokes et al. 2013; Luna 2014. 
37 Shefter 1977. 
38 Stokes et al. 2013, chap. 9. 
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differing socioeconomic structure and their more limited experience with 
democracy,39 we are left with eleven potential cases. These cases are listed in Table 1, 
together with summary information on the key variables in my model and their 
measurement. The antecedent condition is constituted by the strength of the right prior 
to the emergence of the left, which strongly determines the establishment’s response 
to the left. Building on Gibson, the key criterion to assess the strength of the right is 
whether or not a nationalized conservative party predated mass politics, or whether 
conservative parties were regionally fragmented.40 Only where the right was united in 
one or two nationalized parties were they able to effectively defend conservative 
interests and counter the mobilization of the left. Because Gibson does not extensively 
document his classification of countries based on this criterion, I draw on further 
sources to do so in the next section. I also complement the assessment by drawing on 
the vote share of parties defending conservative interests in the lower legislative 
chamber immediately prior to the critical juncture for those cases where this 
information is available from Nohlen.41 The strength of the right in parliament is 
crucial because it determines whether conservative forces will be able to block 
legislation or at least constitutional changes that threaten their interests. Next, Table 1 
provides detailed information on the timing of the critical juncture – the emergence of 
a left-wing actor capable of polarizing redistributive conflicts. The most crucial 
variable is the length of the ensuing polarization period. Some countries experienced 
protracted polarization over decades of elections, while in others these episodes were 
                                                
39 Rueschemeyer et al. 1992. 
40 Gibson 1996, chap. 1. 
41 Nohlen 2005. 
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either inexistent or too short and temporally remote to structure party alternatives in 
the 1990s, when the dependent variable is measured. Note that polarization does not 
necessarily arise as an immediate consequence of the extension of the franchise: 
While it more or less did so in Chile (1918), in Argentina, the polarization phase 
begins several decades after the introduction of universal suffrage in 1912 because the 
growth of the Radicals that occurred after the extension of the franchise did not 
strongly polarize the economic dimension of conflict.42 Finally, Table 1 indicates the 
predicted outcome of the critical juncture, namely, the level of congruence between 
voter preferences and party positions in the 1980s and 1990s. While the next section 
tracks the evolution of six party systems along the routes of polarization and aborted 
polarization using comparative history, Appendix A in the online supporting material 
to this article discusses the classification of all eleven countries and the timing of the 
antecedent and polarization phases in more detail than is possible here.  
  
                                                
42 Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, 179. 
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In selecting cases for the comparative historical analysis, I start out by choosing 
four cases featuring a strong right in order to flesh out the importance of the 
interaction between the strength of the right and the role of the left. By the standards 
set out in Table 1, Chile, Uruguay, Colombia and Venezuela clearly featured strong 
conservative parties or coalitions prior to the emergence of the left. Two of these, 
Chile and Uruguay, experienced prolonged party system polarization. I include both 
because Chile is the classical case of a party system polarized along the economic 
left-right divide, while this claim is more controversial in the Uruguayan case. My 
analysis will show, however, that despite the differences in the make-up of their party 
systems, these cases share important commonalities in terms of my independent 
variables that result in a similar outcome. The selection of Uruguay is also important 
because of it allows me to include a most similar systems comparison, which is nested 
within the most different systems design: The origins of the Uruguayan and the 
Colombian party systems are remarkably similar, but the paths these countries 
followed bifurcated when it comes to the persistence of polarization. On the other 
hand, Colombia shares the important commonality with Venezuela that polarization 
was aborted as a result of their pacted transitions back to democracy in 1958. The 
inclusion of both cases with pacted regime transitions underlines that such agreements 
may result in deviations from the polarization path despite the existence of a strong 
right-wing conservative party with a nationwide organization (the critical antecedent). 
Furthermore, the rather sudden breakdown of the Venezuelan party system has proven 
difficult to account for by scholarship within the party system institutionalization 
approach, while it is easily explained using my framework.  
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I then select two cases with a weak right, one of which – Argentina – nonetheless 
saw prolonged periods of polarization. I focus on the Peronist phase, rather than the 
challenge to the traditional political and landowning elite launched by the Radicals 
from the 1880s onwards because the Peronists polarized the party system much more 
strongly along the economic dimension of conflict, as noted above.43 In Peru, on the 
other hand, polarization was aborted, as was the case in Brazil, Bolivia, and Mexico, 
countries that also followed Route 4 in Figure 1. As indicated in Table 1, the 
predicted outcome in all these cases except Argentina is a low level of congruence in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Among the countries that never experienced significant 
polarization or saw it aborted, Peru is particularly interesting to single out because of 
the similarities it shares with Argentina. Certainly, Argentina and Peru always 
differed fundamentally in economic structure and the level of modernization, yet the 
nature and scope of left-wing mobilization they experienced in the 1940s was 
comparable. Collier and Collier extensively highlight these commonalities, and 
indeed analyze the two countries using paired comparison.44 My analysis highlights a 
crucial difference between Argentina and Peru, namely, the degree to which these 
countries experienced prolonged polarization. Note that this contrast, in turn, may be 
partly due to the capacity of the Argentine labor movement to resist repression, which 
is related to the more industrialized nature of the Argentine economy. This does not, 
however, suggest an alternative causal mechanism to explain long-term differences in 
the quality of representation: Indeed, the structural factors along which Argentina and 
Peru differ played out exactly through the political variables I focus on. The causal 
                                                
43 See Appendix A in the online supporting material for a more extended discussion. 
44 Collier and Collier 2002, 316-350, 469-497. 
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relationships between political and structural variables are discussed in more detail 
towards the end of this article. 
None of the countries excluded from the more in-depth analysis presents a problem 
for my theory. The phases of polarization in Mexico, Bolivia, and Brazil were far too 
short and historically remote to anchor the party system in the populace and shape 
voters’ interpretation of politics towards the end of the twentieth century. Aided by 
the weakness of the right, revolutionary movements became hegemonic in Mexico 
and temporarily in Bolivia, on the other hand, underscoring that a balance of power 
between left and right is necessary to keep polarization alive. Ecuador and Paraguay, 
finally, did not witness significant ideological party system polarization until very 
recently, which was to a large degree the consequence of the weakness of the left. 
 
Comparative historical analysis 
 
To guide the comparative analysis of the six cases singled out for detailed 
examination, Figure 2 presents a summary of the research design and of the results of 
the analysis. The explanatory variables are the presence or absence of a strong party 
of the right (the critical antecedent condition), and whether prolonged party 
differentiation occurred or not following the critical juncture. The outcome to be 
explained is indicated at the bottom of the figure: the congruence between party 
positions and voter preferences in the 1980s, after the most recent wave of 
democratization. Figure 2 thus differs from Figure 1, which presented the general 
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theory, in that it presents a more detailed summary of the actors and strategies 
involved in the processes of polarization and aborted polarization.  
 
 
Figure 2: Summary of country trajectories resulting from the strength of the right and 
the mobilization of the left 
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Left-wing polarization in Chile and Uruguay, and aborted polarization in Colombia 
The Chilean and Uruguayan trajectories show the ideal-typical case of a strong right 
and a strong left that offered voters clear alternatives and whose balance of power 
allowed both open competition and polarization to be sustained for several decades 
until the military coups of the 1970s. Polarization occurred in two steps in Chile, and 
the strong protection of elite interests during the first phase was propitious for the 
formation of partisan alignments. In Chile’s “Parliamentary Republic” of 1891, a 
competitive party system and a nationwide religious cleavage had emerged. This 
history of early institutionalized conflict endowed Chile with strong Conservative and 
Liberal parties that until the early 1970s proved capable of securing the interests of 
the upper classes.45 From the 1920s onwards, the mobilization of the Communist and 
Socialist left fundamentally transformed the party system.46 While left-wing 
participation in coalition governments between 1938 and 1948 produced rather 
disappointing results for the working class, the left moderated somewhat in terms of 
rhetoric, but not substantially.47 The oligarchy remained in a strong electoral position 
until the 1950s due to its clientelistic control of the vote of the rural population.48 The 
second phase of polarization was inaugurated when the Christian Democrats started 
mobilizing rural laborers in the late 1950s, socializing larger segments of the 
population into ideological party politics. As continued mobilization in the 
                                                
45 Scully 1992, 62-170; Collier and Collier 2002, 100-113; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, 191-2; Gibson 
1996, 33-4. 
46 Scully 1992, chap 3. 
47 Drake 1978, 176-181, 254-7. 
48 Collier and Collier 2002, 104, 107. 
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countryside and urban shantytowns eroded vertical patron-client relationships, the 
Conservatives and the Liberals first responded by fusing into the National Party in 
defense of conservative interests.49 When the left won the presidency and the 
legislature majorities resulted in stalemate, non-electoral cycles of mobilization and 
counter-mobilization intensified.50 In the end, the right abandoned its support for the 
democratic regime: In 1973, a military coup ended Chile’s impressive record of 
uninterrupted elections that had begun in 1932. When the military regime stepped 
back from power, it turned out that that the balance of power between the left and 
right had not changed. I thus expect high levels of congruence in Chile in the post-
Pinochet phase. 
 
Uruguay and Colombia represent critical cases for my argument since they share 
strikingly similar features in terms of their pre-democratic order and the make-up of 
their two-party systems until the 1960s. At the elite level, a pluralistic order was 
facilitated by two factors. First, the two camps were of similar strength, and thus 
unable to defeat one another in the days of civil war. Secondly, the oligarchy was 
divided and represented in both of the traditional parties.51 Most importantly, in both 
Uruguay and Colombia, one of the traditional parties moved to the left to attract 
working-class and other left-leaning voters. But while the Liberals in Colombia 
moved back to the center after the Civil War, the Colorados in Uruguay maintained a 
                                                
49 Valenzuela 1977; Scully 1992, 106-170; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, 180; Coppedge 1998, 183. 
50 Bermeo 2003, 138-176. 
51 González 1991; Wilde 1978; Coppedge 1998, 177-180. 
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left-wing profile until the growth of the Frente Amplio in the 1960s. While Collier 
and Collier’s comparison emphasizes these similarities between Uruguay and 
Colombia,52 the two countries diverge at the critical juncture postulated by my model, 
explaining patterns of representation from the 1960s to this date. As a consequence, 
these two party systems could hardly look more different today. 
In Colombia, the progressive turn of the Liberals destabilized the traditional 
arrangement between Liberals and Conservatives, involving shared patronage 
resources to rally support, and ultimately ushered in the 1948-1958 civil war known 
as “La Violencia”.53 To end the fighting, the “National Front” was established in 
1958, a constitutional provision in which the Liberals and the Conservatives agreed to 
refrain from polarization, to alternate in the presidency, to distribute bureaucratic 
posts outside the civil service equitably, and to exclude all other parties from 
competing.54 While the left itself was too weak to forcefully demand its inclusion, the 
Cold War political climate produced powerful pressures from within and without the 
country to outlaw the Communists, marginalizing the left.55 In the resulting façade 
democracy, local political bosses obtained a vital role in distributing patronage and in 
securing the loyal vote for the regime.56 Consequently, Colombia represents an 
instance of cartelization, where the established parties jointly exclude challengers, 
either by an outright ban, as was the case until 1978, or by their privileged access to 
                                                
52 Collier and Collier 2002, 124-5, 748. 
53 Collier and Collier 2002, 312-3, 458; Wilde 1978; Bejarano 2011, 123. 
54 Hartlyn 1988, 54-65; Martz 1997, 35; Di Tella 2004, 94-6. 
55 Bejarano 2011, 90-129. 
56 Wilde 1978; Martz 1997; Archer 1995; Hartlyn 1988; Collier and Collier 2002, 671-3. 
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state resources, the strategy they continued to pursue thereafter. Only in the recent 
years did the established parties see a gradual erosion of their dominant position. For 
the post-1980s period, I expect the Colombian party system to be rather 
institutionalized due to a history of cartelization, but to display low levels of 
congruence. 
In Uruguay, on the other hand, polarization was sustained, and there was never a 
pact or an agreement to limit the choice of policy options, as Collier and Collier 
themselves highlight.57 Crucially, the established parties did not outlaw the 
Communists, which they did in Colombia. The adoption of legislation in favor of the 
working class by the Colorados provoked a strong conservative counter-reaction, and 
an authoritarian interlude between 1933 and 1942. But contrary to what was the case 
for pro-labor parties in Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Mexico, the Colorado Party 
in Uruguay did not move back to the center, as Collier and Collier’s comparative case 
studies impressively show. While progressive elements were expulsed from the 
parties that had incorporated the working class in all the other cases studied by Collier 
and Collier, the Colorados in Uruguay tellingly chose not to do so for fear that they 
would join the left-wing opposition.58 Thus, the presence of the Communists was 
crucial, although the Colorados retained the overwhelming share of the left-wing vote 
until the 1960s. Indeed, Coppedge’s expert survey reports contrasting positions for the 
Colorados and Blancos until 1966.59 Certainly, clientelism played a major role in 
Uruguayan politics until the 1960s, but González argues convincingly that politics in 
                                                
57 Collier and Collier 2002, 453-6. 
58 Collier and Collier 2002, 454. 
59 Coppedge 1997. 
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Uruguay cannot have been only a matter of clientelism, as some would have it.60 
Rather, the cases of Uruguay and Chile defy the notion of a direct and linear trade-off 
between clientelistic and programmatic linkages.61 When the Colorados moved to the 
center in the mid-1960s, the Frente Amplio, which united the Communists, the 
Christian Democrats, and progressive lists from within the traditional parties, 
polarized the party system anew.62 While non-electoral mobilization and polarization 
in public spaces – not so much in the party system, as Bermeo demonstrates63 – 
ultimately resulted in a military coup, it is striking to which degree partisan 
alignments survived the harsh military dictatorship that lasted from 1973 to 1984: In 
the first elections after re-democratization, the party system re-surfaced virtually 
unchanged, the volatility between the 1971 and the 1984 elections being limited to 
5.2%.64 This is strong evidence for robust links between social groups and political 
parties that keep parties responsive to voter preferences. 
 
Venezuela’s pacted democracy and the end of polarization 
The early trajectory of the Venezuelan party system was markedly different from the 
Colombian one. What these two countries have in common is that pacts between the 
left and right aborted polarization. The Pact of Punto Fijo that Acción Democrática 
(AD) and the Comité Político Electoral Independiente (COPEI) agreed upon in 1958 
                                                
60 González 1991, 25-8. 
61 Luna 2014. 
62 González 1991, 128; Collier and Collier 2002, 643-648. 
63 Bermeo 2003, 100-137. 
64 McDonald and Ruhl 1989, 104. 
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to re-establish democracy was less rigid than the National Front in Colombia, as it did 
not outlaw all opposition parties.65 Nonetheless, the outcome was similar in that 
programmatic distinctiveness was lost, and in that politics centered almost exclusively 
on the distribution of clientelistic benefits. After AD had been ousted from power at 
the end of its three-year rule between 1945 and 1948, its main goal in 1958 was to 
make stable democracy possible by avoiding the polarization that had led to the 1948 
coup. Indeed, Venezuela’s “pacted democracy” that extended from 1958 to the 1990s 
is often considered a success story and a model for the viability of democracy in the 
unstable 1960s and 1970s.66  
The result of the Pact of Punto Fijo was an effective de-politicization of economic 
policy issues, aided by the wealth created by oil. Originally together with a third 
party, AD and COPEI agreed on a number of policy principles, as well as to share 
both power and patronage resources such as “(...) access to state jobs and contracts, a 
partitioning of ministries, and a complicated spoils system which would ensure the 
political survival of all signatories”.67 Although the Communists had been part of the 
coalition demanding the return to democracy, they were excluded from the agreement, 
and were banned in 1962 due to their armed resistance against the regime. AD and 
COPEI came to dominate not only the electoral arena, but also civil society, co-opting 
all independent organization. Clientelism became rampant, and parties no longer 
exhibited contrasting policy profiles.68 Although open contestation was re-established 
                                                
65 Bejarano 2011. 
66 E.g., Karl 1986; Collier and Collier 2002; but see Coppedge 1994 for a more critical view. 
67 Karl 1986, 213. 
68 Coppedge 1994, 18-46, 136-52; Roberts 2003; Lyne 2008; Ellner 2008. 
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in 1968 and left-wing opposition parties re-emerged, AD and COPEI’s capacity to 
deliver particularistic benefits allowed the duopoly to govern the country for another 
three decades. This situation was similar to the one in Colombia immediately after the 
end of the National Front in 1978, although the Colombian party system de-
institutionalized more rapidly. After the drying up of the resources to fuel AD and 
COPEI’s clientelistic networks in the 1980s, and their ever more collusive behavior in 
the 1990s, both traditional parties in Venezuela broke down in the election that 
brought Hugo Chávez to power.69 The data from the 1990s, shortly before Chávez’ 
first presidential bid, will allow me to verify the hypothesis that the Venezuelan party 
system lacked programmatic responsiveness, thereby enabling an outsider to win the 
presidency. 
 
Polarization that persists and polarization that ends: Peru and Argentina 
Peru and Argentina are countries with left-wing or progressive movements capable of 
winning popular majorities. Because pre-democratic elites had not succeeded in 
overcoming their divisions, conservative parties had remained regionally based.70 Due 
to the military’s capacity and will to prevent progressive movements from gaining 
power, the outcome was a long history of military involvement in politics. The crucial 
difference between the two cases, as can be seen in Figure 2, is that Peru’s Popular 
Revolutionary American Alliance (APRA) moved to the center in an illusive quest to 
gain acceptance by the military establishment, while the Argentine Peronists 
                                                
69 Roberts 2003; Lupu 2014. 
70 Gibson 1996, chap. 1-2; Di Tella 2004, 8. 
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stubbornly pushed polarization. Thus, for all the structural differences in the 
economies of these two countries, in political terms, Argentina and Peru constitute a 
most similar systems comparison, as they differ in terms of the durability of the 
polarization triggered by the left.  
Peru’s APRA was founded in 1924. The party forged close ties to the union 
movement and became the dominating force on the left, outflanking the Communist 
party. With no party to defend conservative interests in the electoral arena, however, 
the military intervened continuously whenever it saw the vital interests of the 
oligarchy as threatened.71 Although APRA’s programmatic stance had been less 
radical than that of its counterparts in Mexico, Venezuela, and Bolivia from the start, 
according to Collier and Collier, the only way for APRA to have a chance in 
governing was to moderate its profile even more, and to form alliances with right-
wing parties to ensure civilian rule.72 Ultimately, this resulted in the adoption of rather 
conservative positions and in the watering down of the party’s ideological profile. 
APRA’s move away from the left and the coming to power of a reformist military 
government in 1968 then created ample space for revolutionary parties that flourished 
in the 1970s. After uniting in the Izquierda Unida in the early 1980s, the coalition 
collapsed a few years later, however, due to internal contradictions, including the 
response to give to the Shining Path adopting a strategy of armed political struggle 
against the state.73 In the poor urban neighborhoods, neither APRA, nor the new 
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parties of the left had succeeded in supplanting the dominant clientelistic networks.74 
But re-democratization did not reverse Peru’s historical legacy of aborted 
polarization: The 1980s were marked by high levels of volatility, as successive center-
right and APRA administrations suffered devastating setbacks after their terms in 
office.75 Although APRA had moved back to the left under Toledo, and won the 1985 
presidential elections, the party was unable to consolidate its success due to Toledo’s 
failure to resolve the economic crisis. The fact that Alberto Fujimori was able to win 
the presidency in 1990 without being backed by an established party underscores that 
no stable links existed between social groups and parties in Peru.76 In the 1990s, I 
therefore expect low levels of congruence between parties and voters.  
Despite the threat that democracy may be overturned, the Peronist party in 
Argentina never moderated its programmatic position after its sudden rise in the 
1940s, nor did it form alliances with political opponents. While some would claim 
that Peronism did not have a left-wing ideology, the Peronist-anti-Peronist 
antagonism in fact represents a sectoral divide: Peronism pulled protectionist 
segments of the rural elites into an alliance with the urban working class and other 
social groups.77 Peron’s early redistributive economic policies and the attainment of 
full employment made his party attract urban working class voters exhibiting a clear 
ideological profile.78 According to Collier and Collier, Perón’s first presidency 
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constituted a “…dramatic shift away from earlier patterns of state-labor relations to 
one in which, in symbolic and ideological terms, the government dramatically sided 
with the working class”.79  
In comparison, the phases of polarization were considerably shorter in Peru than in 
Argentina. In Argentina, Peronist and anti-Peronist identities were reinforced by 
political conflict during the entire phase between 1946 and 1966, the advent of the 
first bureaucratic-authoritarian regime.80 In Peru, the polarized election of 1931 was 
immediately followed by the repression of APRA. Due to Peronism’s penetration of 
the militant labor movement, polarization was also maintained during phases in which 
the party was banned, as between 1955 and 1966.81 Consequently, the Peronist party 
kept its distinctive programmatic profile and retained a loyal constituency even under 
periods of dictatorship, as Lupu and Stokes show.82 Another key difference between 
Argentina and Peru lies in the presence of the Radicals, a strongly institutionalized 
middle-class party that came to unite the anti-Peronist opposition. Thus, Lupu and 
Stokes present evidence that despite the weakness of conservative interests in the 
party system, the Argentine party system was polarized along class lines from 1946 
onwards.83 While democratic competition remained fragile and was punctuated by 
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military intervention, ideological conflict nonetheless became institutionalized and 
created strong and enduring political identities. When the military regime was toppled 
in the early 1980s, not only did the pre-coup party system re-emerge; party support 
continued to be clearly structured by social class in the 1983 elections.84 Due to the 
limited periods of open contestation, but high levels of polarization, I expect at least 
intermediate levels of voter-party congruence for Argentina in the 1990s. 
 
Testing the predictions: Patterns of party system institutionalization and the quality of 
representation in the 1990s 
 
In this section, I use available quantitative evidence that confirms the impact of the 
critical juncture in my model on party systems after the wave of re-democratization in 
the 1980s. I started out by arguing that party system institutionalization is a necessary, 
but not a sufficient condition for responsiveness. To substantiate this argument, I 
locate countries along the dimensions of party system institutionalization and the 
party-voter congruence. To measure party system institutionalization, I use 
Mainwaring and Scully’s overall measure for the period from the early 1980s to the 
early 1990s.85 The assessment of party system congruence after re-democratization, 
my key dependent variable, would ideally rely on data from the 1980s. While we lack 
suitable data from this period, Luna and Zechmeister’s seminal article offers an 
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assessment of congruence for the late 1990s.86 Their measure of congruence is based 
on the correspondence between voter preferences and party positions across a number 
of issue bundles including economic and religious issues, preferences for a democratic 
regime, law and order, and good governance. Because Luna and Zechmeister’s 
measurement does not include Peru and Venezuela, I impute values for these two 
countries using Kitschelt et al.’s index of “programmatic partisan structuration”, 
which combines Luna and Zechmeister’s original measure with several additional 
components measuring the clarity of partisan alternatives.87 The high correlation 
between the two indices and the computation of the imputed values is documented in 
the online supporting material to this article (Appendix B).88 
Figure 3 plots party system institutionalization and programmatic partisan 
structuration against each other. This results in four possible combinations, three of 
which are likely to be empirically populated: institutionalized congruent party 
systems, institutionalized non-congruent systems (based on stable patron-client 
relationships), and non-institutionalized systems (which may be a reflection of 
competitive or personalistic patron-client relationships). Because institutionalization 
is a prerequisite for congruence, a non-institutionalized congruent party system is 
unlikely to exist.  
 
                                                
86 Luna and Zechmeister 2005. 
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Figure 3: Party system institutionalization and voter-party congruence in the 1980s-
1990s 
 
In line with expectations, Chile and Uruguay exhibit highly institutionalized party 
systems that closely mirror voter preferences. Both countries are situated close to the 
conceptual maximum on both scales. Argentina, on the other hand, is also located in 
the upper right quadrant, but takes a more intermediate position with respect to both 
measures. This is the expected outcome of the strong political identities resulting from 
the long-term conflict between Peronists and Radicals, but the more limited 
experience of open democratic elections. Peru, on the other hand, a case of aborted 
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polarization, is characterized by similarly low performance both in terms of 
institutionalization and congruence (lower left quadrant). As predicted, three other 
cases of aborted polarization from Table 1 – Ecuador, Bolivia, and Brazil – are also 
located in this quadrant. Finally, the presence of cases in the upper left quadrant 
underscores that party system institutionalization cannot be equated with congruence. 
Both Venezuela and Colombia were governed by party cartels since the late 1950s 
that distorted the “playing field”89 between the traditional parties that enjoyed access 
to clientelistic resources, and a fragmented opposition that did not. Similarly to 
Mexico, they exhibit high stability, but score far lower in terms of the quality of 
representation than the polarization cases. For all the similarities between the 
Colombian and the Uruguayan party systems up to the 1940s, these two countries 
differ in terms of the polarization they experienced since the late 1950s.  
 
Rival explanations 
 
The preceding section has shown that my historical model explains the quality of 
representation in the 1990s well. How does my account and the evidence presented 
here compare to alternative explanations? I discuss three related arguments. The first 
states that historical factors no longer matter after a so-called “neo-liberal critical 
juncture”, and that more proximate factors than those analyzed in this article in fact 
explain differences between party systems in Latin America. The second argument 
focuses on the role of the welfare state, while the third emphasizes the role of 
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modernization. Starting with the first argument, Kenneth Roberts draws the difference 
between labor mobilizing party systems that feature strong working-class parties with 
links to organized labor, and those party systems in which elite parties remained 
largely unchallenged.90 In this and a later article and a book, he argues that these 
historical imprints have been erased by the advent of neo-liberalism in the 1980s.91 I 
suggest that the historical imprint must be conceived differently. What matters for the 
socialization process that forges strong programmatic linkages between parties and 
voters is not simply the presence of a strong left, but polarization within the party 
system – which was by no means the logical consequence of the presence of strong 
labor parties. Chile and Argentina experienced protracted polarization, but Peru did 
not. The same applies to Brazil, Bolivia, and Mexico, which also form part of 
Roberts’ category of “labor-mobilizing party systems”. In the absence of a strong 
right, the left was unable to polarize the political space in the latter cases. And finally, 
Uruguay’s party system is strongly representative of voter preferences despite the 
historical weakness of the left, because polarization occurred between the established 
Colorado and Blanco parties.  
My argument is not that the betrayal of voters that occurs when a left-wing party 
promises leftist policies in its campaign, but then pursues market liberalization once 
in office – what Stokes refers to as “policy switching” and Roberts as a “dealigning 
critical juncture” – does not have the capacity to disrupt voter-party linkages.92 But a 
look at Roberts’ systematic assessment of this phenomenon in Latin America shows 
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that voter betrayal occurs chiefly in cases that had experienced aborted polarization 
earlier on, and already exhibited low levels of congruence between party positions 
and voter preferences.93 In fact, where strong ideological ties between parties and 
social constituencies exist, parties know that policy switching is devastating in 
electoral terms. With respect to my polarization cases, Roberts shows that both the 
left and the right remained true to their ideological credentials during the period of 
neoliberal reform in Chile and Uruguay. Indeed, the left’s opposition against the neo-
liberal reforms pursued by the military regimes in Chile and Uruguay reinforced the 
older antagonism between the left and right in these party systems. However, the neo-
liberal critical juncture model does not provide an explanation for the de-
institutionalization of the Colombian party system, where market reform was pursued 
by the right, and thus should not have disrupted partisan alignments.94  
This leaves us with Argentina as the only case that may have partially deviated 
from its historical path (keeping in mind that I predicted only intermediate levels of 
congruence for this case). But even here the evidence supports my argument. The 
Peronists’ move to the right in pursuit of market reform under Menem in the 1990s is 
a prime example in Stokes’ analysis of policy switches.95 Interestingly, as the results 
for congruence in Figure 3 show, this did not exceedingly damage representation in 
the short run. A more detailed analysis reveals that the Peronists succeeded in pulling 
their electorate to the right, making it follow the party’s shift.96 This is evidence of the 
                                                
93 Namely, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia; see Roberts 2013, Table 1, p. 1437. 
94 Roberts 2013, 1441. 
95 Stokes 2001. 
96 Bornschier 2013, 66. 
 40 
kind of reciprocal voter-party linkages theorized in this article. At the same time, the 
further trajectory of the Argentine case shows that if political actors do not help to 
reproduce historical legacies, their imprint may fade. There is widespread consensus 
that the Peronists’ (increasing) reliance on clientelistic mobilization strategies has 
hampered representation in the longer run.97 On the other hand, the Peronists have 
moved back to the left under Néstor and Cristina Kirchner. In the light of the 2015 
elections, it may even have been premature to deplore the vanishing of the right after 
the “breakdown” of the Radicals in 2003.98 The further trajectory of representation in 
the Argentine party system thus remains open. 
Together with Venezuela, the Argentine case is among those that Lupu seeks to 
explain in a framework emphasizing mechanisms that are similar to my own, but 
operate in the short term.99 According to this author, when “brand dilution” – meaning 
that parties abandon their accustomed spacial positions and lose their distinctive 
policy profiles – coincides with economic crises, they risk devastating defeats from 
which they are unlikely to recover. In the case of Venezuela, I concur with Lupu in 
emphasizing the lack of representativeness of the party system in explaining the 
collapse of both traditional parties (similarly to other authors that in addition have 
emphasized the ebbing of the clientelistic or patronage resources).100 While Lupu’s 
approach sheds light on the proximate causes of party breakdown, his cases of 
breakdown are clustered in my category of aborted polarization, with the partial 
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exception of the Argentine Radicals.101 Our approaches are thus complementary, in 
that I analyze the forces underlying the gradual erosion of a party system’s roots in 
society, which represents the crucial precondition for party system breakdown at a 
moment of crisis. In line with classical realignment theory, the forces of dealignment 
work gradually, while change tends to manifest itself abruptly in a number of “critical 
elections”.102 More generally, while Lupu focuses on how parties’ brands are diluted, 
my emphasis is on the process by which they are created. My model thus helps to 
explain why Chile, Uruguay and Argentina are so different from other Latin 
American party systems. While this fact as such is well known, no coherent 
framework has as yet been put forward to explain it – with the exception of Kitschelt 
et al.’s recent study, to which I now turn. 
Secondly, my argument is related to Kitschelt, Hawkins, Luna, Rosas, and 
Zechmeister’s explanation of the differences in programmatic structuring in Latin 
American party systems.103 The authors convincingly show that early modernization 
(measured in terms of 1928 GDP) is a much better predictor of programmatic 
representation in the 1990s – the same period I am looking at – than later levels of 
GDP, and that contemporary levels of GDP are highly endogenous to historical 
welfare state formation.104 According to the authors, early developing countries 
established inclusive welfare states, which then created the “stakes” of political 
conflict necessary for parties to develop contrasting policy profiles. But Kitschelt et 
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al.’s argument leaves open why welfare states were established in early modernizing 
countries, and who the actors were that helped bring them about. In line with Roberts 
(discussed above), Kitschelt and his colleagues find that the strength of the left or of 
the labor movement is a poor predictor of programmatic party competition.105 In 
consequence, they refute an autonomous role of the party system in triggering both 
welfare state development and good representation.  
Both Roberts and Kitschelt and his colleagues thus fail to find an impact of the 
organization of the left because they neglect the important role of the right. For 
instance, while the labor movement was relatively strong Peru and Bolivia, these 
countries neither saw protracted polarization in the party system, nor was the 
instability of democracy propitious for the development of encompassing welfare 
states. Where conservative forces relied on the military to defend its interests, the 
right was less pressed to preempt the growth of the left by making concessions in 
terms of welfare provisions.106 Consequently, the left was capable of pushing for the 
establishment of welfare states only where a balance of power between left and right 
was present. In these contexts, ideological conflict was channeled into party 
competition, resulting both in strong partisan alignments, and in encompassing 
welfare states. My findings and those of Kitschelt and his colleagues are thus not 
contradictory, because I emphasize factors antecedent to theirs. Our explanations 
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complement one another because Kitschelt et al. highlight an important mechanism of 
how polarized conflict is sustained: by ongoing contention over the welfare state. 
Kitschelt et al.’s analysis has the further merit of showing that economic 
modernization is a less powerful predictor of good representation than the historical 
institutionalist explanations we both offer. If modernization plays a key role, then it 
did so in the first half of the twentieth century. Of course, there is still a significant 
positive correlation between modernization in the 1990s and the quality of 
representation in the same period. But the correlation between early modernization 
and later representation (in the 1990s) is much stronger. Thus, an explanation based 
on modernization must focus on the early period. And in fact, looking at the figures 
for GDP in 1928 that Kitschelt et al. have assembled,107 early modernization is closely 
correlated with historical polarization: My three polarization cases – Argentina, 
Uruguay, and Chile – are those displaying above-average levels of GDP in 1928. 
Early polarization is less intimately related to GDP in 1980 or 1998, because 
Venezuela, Brazil and Mexico have caught up in terms of modernization, but not with 
respect to the quality of representation.  
There is no obvious link from early modernization to representation in the 1990s 
other than that running through features of the party system that derive from the 
historical period. And the fact that the Uruguayan, Chilean, and Argentine party 
systems look so different otherwise suggests that polarization, and not some other 
party system feature matters for representation. What is it, then, about early 
modernization that is conductive both to polarization and the establishment of 
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encompassing welfare states? The exploration of possible explanations is well beyond 
the scope of this article, but I suggest several avenues for further research. First, the 
presence of a comparatively strong right (the Conservatives in Chile, the Blancos in 
Uruguay, and the Radicals in Argentina) may be the result of a specific pattern of 
economic development in the nineteenth century that resulted in early 
industrialization and modernization later on. Thus, the effect of early modernization 
on the party system would run through the strength of the right. Inversely, 
institutionalized elite conflict – and, as a by-product, a strong right – may have 
facilitated early development. Third, to explain the reaction of the establishment 
against the left, it may matter at which point in time polarization occurred. During the 
Great Depression in the 1930s, authoritarian backlashes occurred even in Uruguay 
and Argentina, but with the onset of Import-Substituting-Industrialization (ISI), the 
relationship between the left and right grew less antagonistic. Because the left 
appeared less threatening, party system polarization became compatible with 
democratic regime survival. Countries that only saw significant development after the 
onset of the Cold War, on the other hand, were at an obvious disadvantage, as the 
international climate favored restricted competition. This is most clearly demonstrated 
by the pacted transitions of the 1950s in Colombia and Venezuela, where external 
pressure or at least the international climate played important roles.108 Where the left 
was already firmly institutionalized in the Cold War period, on the other hand, it was 
more difficult to repress – this is why the timing of its mobilization, which in turn is 
related to economic development, may have mattered. As a final possibility, the early 
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developers may have been at an advantage because higher levels of literacy, 
education, and associationalism fostered political interest, involvement, and also 
programmatic polarization. Although it cannot be ruled out on theoretical grounds that 
these factors can contribute to good representation independently of polarization, in 
none of the cases studied in this article did they translate into congruent representation 
in its absence. In sum, the available evidence suggests that polarization is the main 
factor translating early modernization into good representation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To put the findings presented in this article in their simplest form, only those party 
systems in Latin America exhibited congruence in the 1990s in which a challenging 
party had started polarizing the party system several decades earlier. Uruguay, Chile, 
and Argentina followed a trajectory of inclusion and sustained polarization. Conflict 
along the state-market dimension was channeled into party competition in these 
countries, and became engraved in lasting political identities and partisan loyalties. 
Undeniably, high levels polarization are problematic not only for the stability of 
democracy, but also for reaching compromise, as exemplified by contemporary US 
politics. At the same time, Hetherington finds that polarization in the US “has 
clarified public perceptions of party ideology, which has produced a more partisan 
electorate”.109 A key problem in the US context is that parties occupy more extreme 
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positions than their voters.110 In Latin America, the reverse was true for much of the 
twentieth century: Cartels formed by pre-democratic elite parties, sustained by bans 
on left-wing parties, combined with the de-mobilizing effect of clientelism, narrowed 
down the political spectrum. Partially as a consequence, political movements often 
chose extra-parliamentary strategies to achieve their ends, with disastrous 
consequences for democracy. The results of this article suggest, in line with Bermeo’s 
supposition, that at least in the long run, the destabilizing effects of extremism are 
best mitigated by inclusion.111 
Of course, too much polarization can be problematic, both in terms of regime 
stability, as well as for governability. In Latin America, the weakness of the right in 
conjuncture with widespread inequality in the twentieth century certainly made 
ideological moderation appear appealing. According to Collier and Collier, the 
political moderation of the left, and a labor movement tied to the political center, have 
been key in making more inclusive political regimes viable in Colombia, Venezuela, 
as well as in Mexico.112 Likewise, both classical modernization theory, as well as its 
contemporary variants assume that the moderating effects of rising affluence or 
declining inequality make democracy sustainable.113 In the light of the persistent 
differences in the quality of Latin American democracies, privileging the goal of 
stability is problematic, however. In terms of the quality of representation and the 
long-term viability of these democracies, the collusion of the major parties in 
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Colombia and Venezuela, cases that represent success stories from Collier and 
Collier’s point of view, was not propitious. Without meaningful choice, which 
generally implies that segments of society lack representation, democracy carries little 
normative weight. The relationship between polarization and democracy is therefore 
probably best conceived of as a curvilinear one, where too little ideological 
differentiation is equally harmful as too much polarization. 
The irony is that some of the countries that have been considered success cases for 
having avoided polarization in the twentieth century are today confronted with much 
more polarized politics than those that experienced it early on. Starting with 
Venezuela, radical left parties have gained power in various cartelized party systems. 
Whether this development will be beneficial for representation is open to doubt, as the 
party system lacks institutionalization, the playing field has become severely distorted 
in favor of incumbents, and even democracy as a whole is under threat.114 On the 
other hand, the appearance or growth even of moderate ideological alternatives where 
they were historically absent may be able to exert positive effects on representation. 
Indeed, the Brazilian Workers’ Party (PT) ability to claim credit for its social policy 
innovations may establish programmatic linkages between the party and certain social 
constituencies, thereby anchoring the party system more strongly in social structure 
and pushing it in a more programmatic direction. Together with what is happening as 
a consequence of the PAN’s challenge to the PRI in Mexico, this suggests an 
alternative route to programmatic party competition – a route that is open even to 
those countries that lack favorable historical experiences with polarization.  
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